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Abstract
This study examines the determinants of the probability that exporters choose be-
tween a most-favored nation (MFN) scheme and multiple regional trade agreement
(RTA) schemes. It estimates a nested logit model using a transaction-level import
data for Thailand from other ASEAN countries in 2014. The study nds that RTA
schemes are more likely to be chosen rather than the MFN scheme in case of a larger
transaction value. Among RTA schemes, the one with less restrictive rules of origin
or lower RTA tari rates is more likely to be chosen. In addition to some results
of simulation analyses, this study provides some quantitative interpretation of our
estimation results.
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1. Introduction
During the 2010s, regional trade agreements (RTAs) were negotiated among
a large number of countries worldwide in pursuit of the benets of trade liber-
alization. RTAs with a large number of member countries are called \mega"
RTAs. Recent examples of mega RTAs include the Trans-Pacic Partnership
(TPP), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and Regional Com-
prehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). RTA networks in each country pair
will likely overlap with the emergence of mega RTAs. For example, Mexico
has entered into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with
Canada and the U.S., which overlaps with the TPP. Therefore, rms in Mex-
ico have to choose between a most-favored nation (MFN) scheme and multiple
RTA schemes (NAFTA and TPP) when they export to Canada. As this ex-
ample indicates, rms have more opportunities to select from multiple tari
schemes with the emergence of more mega RTAs.
However, rms nd it dicult to choose a tari scheme when multiple
tari schemes are available.1 Firms are required to meet the so-called rules
of origin (RoOs) and obtain certicates of origin (CoOs) when they use RTA
tari schemes. To certify the origin of goods, exporters need to collect the
required documents, such as a list of inputs, a production owchart, production
instructions, invoices for each input, and contract documents. This process
1Some gravity studies have investigated the \overlapping" eects of RTAs. For example,
Egger and Larch (2008) and Chen and Joshi (2010) investigated how an existing RTA
aects the probability of forming another RTA (i.e., domino eects). Lee et al. (2008), Hur
et al. (2010), and Sorgho (2016) examined the trade creation eects of RTAs when RTAs
are overlapped. However, our concept of \overlapping" diers from that in these gravity
studies. Suppose that Countries A and B formed a bilateral RTA. The above gravity studies
consider \overlapping" of RTAs in Country A as the conclusion of a new bilateral RTA
between Countries A and C. Our concept of \overlapping" is represented by the case where
Countries A and B become members of another new RTAs. A rm in Country A faces a
choice between old and new RTAs for particular transactions when exporting to Country B
in our case. However, this choice does not become a matter in the former case because a
rm in Country A faces only one RTA for exports to Country B even after \overlapping" (of
their concept) occurs. Thus, our concept is entirely dierent from theirs. While we examine
such an overlapping situation in Asia, it may be also serious in Africa. See, for example,
Tavares and Tang (2011) and Yang and Gupta (2007).
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arises as xed costs for RTA utilization for exporters. When exporters simply
choose between an MFN scheme and an RTA scheme, they examine whether
the benet from the use of RTA tari rates, which are generally lower than
that from the use of MFN rates, exceeds the xed costs for RTA utilization. In
case of multiple RTA schemes, exporters consider dierences among RTA tari
schemes. These dierences mainly stem from tari rates and RoOs. Therefore,
exporters must compare tari rates and RoOs across RTA schemes to choose
the best one. Furthermore, a change in tari rates in one RTA inuences the
choice of own and other RTA schemes. As the number of overlapped RTAs
increases, such interaction eects are more likely to be present.
The major contribution of this study is that it proposes an empirical frame-
work to investigate rms' choice of tari scheme when multiple RTA schemes
are available. Accordingly, it uses the data of Thai imports from other ASEAN
countries in 2014. There are two main reasons to use this data.2 First, the
data enables us to identify tari schemes (e.g., MFN or RTAs) used in each
transaction. We obtained the data, which covers all commodity imports, from
the Customs Oce of the Kingdom of Thailand. Product coverage is impor-
tant for our study because we need sucient variation in the tari rates and
RoOs across products.3 Second, at least seven tari schemes were available for
Thai imports from ASEAN countries in 2014: an MFN scheme, ASEAN Trade
in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), ASEAN{Australia{New Zealand Free Trade
Agreement (AANZFTA), ASEAN{China FTA (ACFTA), ASEAN{India FTA
(AIFTA), ASEAN{Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP),
and ASEAN{Korea FTA (AKFTA). By examining this trade ow in 2014, we
can investigate how rms choose tari schemes when multiple tari schemes
are available.
In particular, this study provides a framework to examine tari scheme
2According to the World Development Indicators, Thailand ranks 29th in terms of GDP
in the world as of 2014, with a GDP per capita of US$6,000.
3Although several recent papers have employed transaction-level trade data, few studies
have employed data with the information of the tari scheme chosen in each transaction.
One of the examples is the study by Cherkashin et al. (2015). However, the dataset in this
study covered only the apparel industry, whereas our dataset covers all sectors.
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choice at a transaction level. Specically, our framework is the nested logit
model, which can be applied to the case of multiple tari schemes. Our nested
logit model comprises two stages. The upper stage includes two nests and de-
scribes the choice between MFN and RTA schemes. The xed costs for RTA
utilization play a key role in this stage. The existence of such costs separates
an MFN scheme from RTA schemes and helps examine the exporter's two-step
decision regarding tari scheme choice using the nested logit model. Demi-
dova and Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015) demonstrated that RTA
schemes are likely to be chosen in the case of large transactions because the
absolutely larger benets from RTA utilization are more likely to cover the
additional xed costs for RTA utilization.4 The lower-stage decision is with
regard to a specic tari scheme. RTA schemes dier mainly in terms of prefer-
ential tari rates and the restrictiveness of RoOs.5 Therefore, given that rms
choose to utilize RTA schemes at the rst stage, they choose an RTA scheme
that yields the highest prot at the second stage while considering preferential
tari rates and RoOs employed in the available RTA schemes. Consequently,
the RTA scheme with lower preferential tari rates or less restrictive RoOs
will more likely be chosen.
With our estimation results of the nested logit model, this study conducts
various quantitative analyses. First, it examines how changes in tari rates
inuence choice probabilities of own and other tari schemes. Specically, this
study computes the elasticities of the probability of choosing each scheme in
terms of tari rates. Thereafter, it quantitatively demonstrates how dierently
the tari reduction in one RTA inuences the choices of own and other RTAs
and an MFN scheme. These analyses uncover the detailed interaction eects
of tari rates on the choice probability of each tari scheme. Second, this
4Although many studies have used trade values to examine this \size" eect on preference
utilization, our measure of trade values, i.e., transaction values, is the most detailed. Exam-
ples of the measures used in previous studies include annual trade values (e.g., Hakobyan,
2015) or the customs district-level monthly average of trade values (e.g., Keck and Lendle,
2012). Some studies have investigated the role of rm size in terms of the number of em-
ployees (Takahashi and Urata, 2010; Hayakawa, 2014b).
5We will show the more detailed dierence in Section 3.1.
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study presents elasticity with respect to transaction values according to ex-
port countries. This elasticity might provide insight into the dierence in the
magnitude of xed costs for RTA utilization across countries because larger
transaction values lead to larger benets to cover those xed costs; thus, elas-
ticity is expected to be higher if those xed costs are smaller.6 Third, this
study indicates the extent to which scheduled tari reduction inuences the
choice probability of each tari scheme. Furthermore, it investigates how this
choice probability changes if RoOs in all RTAs are set to the least restrictive
type. These simulation analyses will help examine each RTA's utilization in
the nal year and the impacts of revising RoOs to a business-friendly type on
RTA utilization.
This study is related to at least two bodies of literature. The rst type
focuses on the determinants of the use of preference schemes. Typical studies
in this literature explore cases where a single preference scheme is available
in addition to an MFN scheme (e.g., Cadot et al., 2006; Cadot and de Melo,
2007; Francois et al., 2006; Manchin, 2006; Hakobyan, 2015). Few studies have
been conducted from a similar perspective, with two preferential schemes and
an MFN scheme (e.g., Bureau et al., 2007; Hayakawa, 2014a; Hayakawa et al.,
2017). This study extends the empirical framework to analyze choice among
multiple tari schemes by applying transaction-level data to the nested logit
model. Furthermore, in terms of identication, our estimates of tari rates and
RoOs will be better than those in the previous studies because our analysis
6There are two kinds of studies that estimate the costs of preference scheme utilization.
One is to estimate the tari-equivalent costs (Francois et al., 2006; Hayakawa, 2011). Cadot
and de Melo (2007) surveyed this literature, concluding that such xed costs range between
3% and 5% of the product price. The other is to estimate the absolute values of preference
utilization costs (Ulloa and Wagner-Brizzi, 2013; Cherkashin et al., 2015; Hayakawa et al.,
2016). For example, by employing rm-level data from the generalized system of preferences
utilization for exporting apparel products to Europe from Bangladesh, Cherkashin et al.
(2015) structurally estimated the costs (called documentation costs of RoO compliance),
which were US$4,240. Our method is dierent from the methods used in these two kinds of
studies because we relate xed costs for RTA utilization with the elasticity of the probability
of choosing RTA schemes with respect to transaction values. In this sense, our approach
is similar to that in Chen and Moore (2010). Our study complements the studies in this
literature.
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is a cross-RTA analysis within a product rather than a cross-product analysis
within an RTA scheme. The other literature involves a discrete choice analysis
of rms' international business activities. Estimating discrete choice models,
this literature has explored various topics such as rms' location choice among
domestic and overseas locations (Mayer et al., 2010), the ranking of rms'
productivity according to types of FDI entry such as joint venture (Ra et al.,
2012), and rms' choice of invoice currency in international trade (Chung,
2016). Unlike these studies, this study investigates the choice of tari scheme
by estimating the nested logit models.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 species the nested
logit model for empirical analyses. Section 3 explains the data sources and
presents a brief overview of RTAs in Thailand. Section 4 presents the es-
timation results. Section 5 provides some quantitative interpretation of our
estimation results. Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Empirical Framework
This section species our empirical model. This study derives a nested
logit model based on an exporter's choice of tari schemes.7 It considers
the case wherein multiple RTA schemes are available in addition to an MFN
scheme. Each exporter has a rm-specic parameter that positively depends
on elements such as productivity or production capability. When a rm ex-
ports a product to a country, the exporter's decision is decomposed into two
steps. First, a rm decides whether to use an MFN (M) scheme or an RTA
scheme (R(r); r = 1;    ; NR) by comparing the export prot under the MFN
scheme with the largest export prot among the RTA schemes. NR denotes
the number of RTA schemes available for rms. In any case, they need to pay
xed costs for exports. Then, the exporter chooses the most protable RTA
scheme if a rm decides to use RTA schemes. This two-step decision stems
from the fact that RTA schemes qualitatively dier from an MFN scheme as
rms have to pay xed costs for RTA utilization, which is not required for
7The details of our theoretical framework are provided in Appendix A.
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an MFN scheme. Indeed, this supposition will be supported in our empirical
analysis.
Tari schemes dier from each other, and tari rates dier across tari
schemes. In particular, those in any RTAs are not higher than MFN tari rates.
In addition, when exporting under RTA schemes, rms have to incur the costs
of procurement adjustment to comply with RoOs. Various rules exist in RoOs:
change in chapter (CC), change in heading (CH), change in subheading (CS),
wholly obtained (WO), regional value content (RVC), and specic process
(SP). For example, CC and CS, respectively, require exported products to
have dierent two-digit and six-digit HS codes from inputs imported from
non-RTA member countries. In this sense, CC potentially requires exporters
to more drastically adjust their production and input sources compared with
CS. RoOs are set for each product in each RTA. Therefore, the procurement
adjustment cost of a product diers across RTAs.
In addition, xed costs dier between MFN and RTA schemes. As men-
tioned in the introductory section, when exporting under RTA schemes, ex-
porters need to incur additional xed costs for RTA utilization. In this sense,
the total amount of xed costs is larger under RTA schemes than that under
an MFN scheme. This study assumes that xed costs for RTA utilization are
the same across RTA schemes. This assumption is valid at least among RTAs
in our empirical analysis because operational certication procedures (OCP)
for RoOs are the same in most aspects across those RTAs, as conrmed in the
next section. Moreover, this assumption is useful to derive a nested logit equa-
tion to estimate the conditional RTA scheme choice.8 Similar assumptions are
employed in studies on the FDI location choice such as those by Head and
Mayer (2004), Amiti and Javorcik (2008), and Mayer et al. (2010).
To specify our nested logit model for tari scheme choices, this study as-
sumes that the exporter's unobservable production cost follows a generalized
extreme value (GEV) distribution. The probability that producer k chooses
8See Section A.3 of Appendix A. The empirical validity of this assumption is discussed
in detail in Section 3.1.
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alternative Alt in Nest is described as follows:
PAlt(k) = PAltjNest(k)PNest(k); (1)
whereNest = MFN;RTA. There is only one alternativeM in theMFN nest,
i.e., a degenerate nest. In contrast, as listed later, there are six alternatives
in the RTA nest. Thus, Alt = R(1);    ; R(6) given that RTA is chosen for
Nest. PAltjNest(k) is the probability that an exporter chooses Alt given that
the exporter has chosen Nest. The probability that an exporter chooses Nest
is denoted by PNest(k). PMFN(k) is equal to 1   PRTA(k) as the number of
nests in this study is two.
The standard nested logit model can be applied if the following two as-
sumptions hold true: agents' utility is described by the linear combination
of observable and stochastic portions, and the stochastic portion of the util-
ity follows the GEV distribution.9 Under these assumptions, PNest(k) and
PAltjNest(k) are, respectively, written as follows:
PNest(k) = exp
n
XNest(k) + NestIVNest(k)  fIV (k)o ; (2)
PAltjNest(k) = exp

QAlt(k)
Nest
  IVNest(k)

; (3)
where XNest(k) comprises nest-specic determinants that explain the choice
between nests, and QAlt(k) comprises alternative-specic determinants. Using
9The study by McFadden (1978) is the seminal work that explored the nested logit model.
See also Train (2003) for comprehensive explanations of discrete choice models.
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matrix representations, these scalars can be written as
XNest(k) =  [xNest(k)]
T =
h
1    m
i2664
x1;Nest(k)
...
xm;Nest(k)
3775 ;
QAlt(k) =  [qAlt(k)]
T =
h
1    n
i2664
q1;Alt(k)
...
qn;Alt(k)
3775 ;
where  and  are coecient vectors, and m and n are the numbers of nest-
and alternative-specic variables, respectively. xNest(k) and qAlt(k) are vectors
of nest- and alternative-specic determinants, respectively.
Nest is the so-called \log-sum coecient" or \inclusive value (IV) param-
eter," which is inversely related to the correlation of stochastic utility factors
within each nest. IVNest(k) is the IV of a respective nest given by
IVNest(k)  ln
X
Alt2Nest
exp

QAlt(k)
Nest

:
fIV (k) is the prot expected from the available nests and is presented by
~IV (k)  ln
X
Nest
exp fXNest(k) + NestIVNest(k)g :
Because our framework meets the above two assumptions, we can employ the
standard nested logit model to examine the determinants of choice probability
of each tari scheme.
The variables in nest-specic determinants (xNest(k)) include the elements
that inuence the decision of choosing any RTA scheme. We rst include
the value of a concerned transaction. This value contains the information
regarding various elements, such as an exporter-specic cost parameter (e.g.,
exporter's production capability), export country-product-specic cost param-
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eter (e.g., wages), physical transportation costs10, and importer's product-
specic demand. Obviously, higher production capability of an exporter, lower
export country-product-specic cost parameter, lower transportation costs,
and larger product-specic demand of an importer lead to a larger transaction
value. Since a larger transaction value enables exporters to more likely obtain
export prots under RTA schemes enough to cover the additional xed costs
for RTA utilization, the transaction value is expected to be positively related
to the probability of choosing any RTA scheme rather than an MFN scheme.
Second, we explicitly introduce some of the specic elements in addition
to the transaction value. We capture importer's size by import rm-product-
level total imports from the world. To control for transportation costs, we
use a transaction-level dummy variable that takes the value 1 for land trans-
portation (truck or railway) and 0 otherwise (e.g., sea or air). The export
country-product-level cost parameter is captured by the average export price
at a country HS six-digit-level.11 As a result, the remaining variation in the
transaction value will be well related to an exporter-specic production capa-
bility. Kropf and Saure (2014) and Hornok and Koren (2015) demonstrated
that the transaction value increases with exporter's productivity. Therefore,
in this specication, the transaction value is expected to be positively related
to the probability of choosing any RTA scheme rather than an MFN scheme.
qAlt(k) comprises determinants specic to each alternative conditional on
the nest chosen. These include variable cost for RoOs compliance and prefer-
ential tari rate of a particular RTA scheme if the RTA nest is chosen. The
variable costs for RoOs compliance are captured by introducing dummy vari-
10Our variable of transaction values in the empirical analysis is evaluated on a cost,
insurance, and freight basis.
11Our use of these two variables is because of the two kinds of diculty. One is the serious
data limitation because our sample export countries include least developed countries, i.e.,
Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. The other is that unlike the case of location choice analyses,
we do not have sucient variation across export countries (i.e., their number is only eight).
Furthermore, our control of transportation mode is because our sample import country,
Thailand, particularly its capital (Bangkok), is located in the geographical center of our
sample export countries (i.e., ASEAN); geographical distance among the countries does not
dier much. Rather, transportation mode will be more important in transportation costs.
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ables according to types of RoOs, details of which are explained in the next
section. In the case of an MFN nest, which is a degenerate nest, MFN tari
rates are included. Because no RoOs compliance costs are incurred in this
case, all RoOs dummy variables take the value 0 in an alternative of an MFN
scheme. Consequently, an RTA scheme with less restrictive type of RoOs or
lower preferential tari rates will be more likely chosen.
3. Data Issues
This section introduces our data sources, taking brief overviews of our
sample RTAs.
3.1. Data Sources
We estimate the nested logit model represented by eqs. (1){(3) using a
full information maximum likelihood technique. This model is estimated for
the transaction-level choice of tari schemes for Thai imports from ASEAN
countries in 2014. We employ transaction-level import data that cover all
commodity imports and examine the choice of tari schemes in each transac-
tion of a product from individual ASEAN country to Thailand. Our dataset
contains the customs clearing date, HS eight-digit code, exporting country,
rm identication code, tari scheme, and import values in Thai Baht. Tari
schemes comprise three categories, including an MFN scheme, RTA schemes,
and other schemes. Tari payments for imports under \the other schemes"
are exempted on the basis of ve schemes: bonded warehouses, free zones,
investment promotion, duty drawback for raw materials imported for the pro-
duction of exports, and duty drawback for re-exportation. In our study, we
drop import transactions under these other schemes.
As of 2014, seven tari schemes are available when rms in Thailand im-
port from ASEAN countries: an MFN scheme and six RTA schemes. Among
them, ATIGA was introduced in 2010 by revising the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) that became eective among 10 ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambo-
dia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thai-
land, and Vietnam) in the 1990s. In addition, Thailand, together with the
11
other ASEANmembers, has concluded ve plurilateral RTAs, called ASEAN+1
RTAs. ACFTA was introduced in 2005 among 10 ASEAN countries and China
after signing the Framework Agreement on China{ASEAN Comprehensive
Economic Cooperation at the sixth China{ASEAN Summit in November 2002.
AJCEP was introduced in 2008 among several ASEAN countries and Japan. It
came into eect in Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia in 2009 and in
the Philippines in 2010. Importantly, its eectuation for Indonesia has pended.
Thus, we do not include import transactions from Indonesia in our estimation
since the number of available tari schemes is dierent.12 AKFTA on trade in
goods was introduced among several ASEAN countries and Korea in 2007. It
became eective in Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, and the Philippines in 2008, fol-
lowed by Thailand in 2010. AANZFTA was introduced in 2010 among several
ASEAN countries, Australia, and New Zealand. It came into eect in Laos
and Cambodia in 2011 and in Indonesia in 2012. AIFTA was introduced in
2010 among several ASEAN countries and India. It became eective in Laos,
Cambodia, and the Philippines in 2011.
The dierence between alternative RTAs mainly stems from preferential
tari rates and types of RoOs. There are several types of tari reduction, or
elimination, in ASEAN RTAs. For example, \immediate elimination" refers
to completely eliminating taris just after the eectuation, and \gradual re-
duction" (or long phase) means to gradually reduce taris for some years. The
tari reduction may start some years after RTA's introduction (\late start").
In the case of \partial reduction," the nal level of preferential rates is not
zero but at some positive level.13 The dierence in preferential tari rates
across RTAs is yielded by the abovementioned dierence in entry years and
the fact that typical types of tari reduction are not necessarily \immediate
12As one of the robustness checks, we will later add observations of exports from Indonesia.
13Theoretical studies have discussed what kind of elements are related to the choice of
these liberalization patterns. For example, the extent of production factor mobility is taken
as one of the elements. If the production factors in import-competing industries can be
moved freely across industries, then preferential rates will immediately be set to zero due
to no lobbying in such case. In addition, the speed of tari reduction is shown to increase
with the degree of capital mobility (Maggi and Rodrguez-Clare, 2007).
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elimination." For example, in AJCEP in Thailand, 43% of tari-line products
follow \gradual reduction," whereas \immediate elimination" is found in 26%
of tari-line products. Consequently, preferential tari rates are likely to dif-
fer by RTAs and years. As we will see later (i.e., Table 2), RoOs dier across
RTAs because these are determined according to negotiation among member
countries.14
As mentioned in the previous section, the OCP, which is related to addi-
tional xed costs for RTA utilization, is the same across our sample RTAs in
most aspects. For example, the cumulation rule, back-to-back CoOs, and the
third country invoice are allowed in all six RTAs. In addition, the third-party
certication system is adopted in all six RTAs.15 The commission charge for
CoOs diers across countries but is same across RTAs in each country (see
Table 1 in the study by Hayakawa et al., 2016). One notable dierence is the
availability of the De Minimis rule16, which is available in AJCEP, AKFTA,
ATIGA, and AANZFTA but not in ACFTA and AIFTA. However, we believe
that this dierence is much less signicant than qualitative dierence between
an MFN scheme and RTA schemes. Thus, these indierences across RTAs
will support our assumption of common xed costs for RTA utilization across
alternative RTAs in our empirical framework.17
14In Appendix B, we show the distribution of AJCEP preferential products in Thailand
according to tari reduction types. In addition, as an example of dierences in tari rates
and RoOs, we show the case of \household or laundry-type washing machines (each of a dry
linen capacity not exceeding 6 kg)" (HS84501110).
15The cumulation rule allows inputs from other RTA member countries to be taken as
\originating inputs" when certifying the origin. For more details regarding cumulation,
see Appendix C. The back-to-back CoOs are issued by the second exporting party for the
re-export of goods based on the CoOs issued by the rst exporting party. Third country
invoicing allows originating goods to qualify for preferential tari treatment even if the
accompanying sales invoice is issued by a company located in a third country. The third-
party certication system is a system wherein third parties such as a relevant Ministry or a
Chamber of Commerce take a role in issuing CoOs.
16This is a bailout measure in the change in tari classication rule and allows non-
originating inputs to have the same tari classication if those inputs occupy only a certain
small share in prices of export products (e.g., 10%).
17There are some dierences in other non-tari issues, such as intellectual property right or
government procurement although it is not necessarily clear how these elements are related
to the xed costs for RTA utilization. However, these rules are applied specic to countries,
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Our data sources for independent variables are as follows. The data on RTA
preferential rates and RoOs are obtained from the legal text of each RTA. The
data on MFN rates are obtained from the Customs oce of Thailand. In
Thailand, tari rates are set at an HS eight-digit level, which includes 9,557
tari lines. RoOs in all RTAs are set at an HS six-digit level, which includes
5,204 codes. The HS version in our analysis is HS 2012. The data on trans-
portation mode and import rm-product level total imports from the world
are obtained from our transaction-level import data. The average export price
is constructed using the import data obtained from UN Comtrade. Speci-
cally, we rst compute unit export prices (export prices per kilogram) for each
country pair at an HS six-digit level in 2014. Then, we aggregate those prices
by arithmetic average according to export countries. In this aggregation, we
do not include export prices to Thailand.
3.2. Data Overview
Before presenting our estimation results, we take brief overviews of RTAs
in Thailand. Table 1 reports preferential status and tari rates by RTA scheme
in 2014. In 2014, the arithmetic average of MFN rates in Thailand was 11.5%.
\Number" shows the number of tari-line products in which RTA rates are
lower than MFN rates (i.e., the number of lines eligible to each RTA). \Share
in Total line" and \Share in Dutiable line" denote the shares of that number in
all tari-line products and in products with positive MFN rates, respectively.
\Average RTA rates" indicates the arithmetic average of tari rates among
all products. In the case of products ineligible to RTA schemes, we put MFN
rates when computing the average RTA rates.
Table 1 shows that ATIGA has a highest liberalization level partly because
it was introduced in the earliest period among member countries (the former
version of ATIGA is AFTA, which became eective in Thailand in 1993). All
products have either zero MFN rates or ATIGA preferential rates lower than
MFN rates. Consequently, the average ATIGA tari rates are almost zero.
not RTA schemes. For example, once strong IPR is set in one RTA, it is eective among
member countries regardless of rules set in other RTAs concluded among those countries.
14
Table 1: Preferential Status and Tari Rates by RTA Schemes in 2014
Eligible lines Average
Number Share in Share in RTA rates
Total line (%) Dutiable line (%) (%)
AANZ 7,157 75 93 1.81
AC 6,739 71 88 2.07
ATIGA 7,657 80 100 0.01
AI 5,924 62 77 5.21
AJ 6,499 68 85 3.50
AK 6,541 68 85 2.55
Source: Authors' computation using the legal text of each RTA
Despite relatively later eectuation, AANZFTA has a high liberalization level.
As of 2014, more than 90% of all products already have either zero MFN rates
or low AANZFTA preferential rates. Furthermore, AIFTA has the lowest
liberalization level. The average RTA rates in AIFTA are still over 5%.
Table 2 reports the distribution of RoOs by RTA schemes at an HS six-
digit level. It shows various types and combinations. The typical RoOs are
CH/RVC in the cases of ATIGA, AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA; RVC in
the case of ACFTA; and CS&RVC in the case of AIFTA. There is a rela-
tively large number of CC in AJCEP. Notably, in the estimation, we construct
dummy variables for RoOs based on a broader classication to keep a su-
cient number of observations for each type of RoOs. Such RoOs are shown in
the \Simplied" column. Specically, CC, CH, and CS are categorized into
change in tari classication (CTC). Furthermore, RoOs with a very small
number of observations are dropped or simplied. For example, products with
\SP" in any RTAs are dropped (as shown in Table 2, such observations exist
in the case of AANZFTA). In the case of RoOs combined with SP, we ignore
a component of SP. For example, CTC&SP and CTC/SP are simplied to
CTC.18
Table 3 reports the number and value of imports from eight ASEAN coun-
18Without these modications, we cannot obtain the convergence of log likelihood in the
estimation due to the small number of chosen observations in some types of RoOs.
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Table 2: RoOs by RTA Schemes at an HS Six-digit Level
Original Simplied AANZ AC ATIGA AI AJ AK
CC CTC 247 1 1,079 5
CC&RVC CTC&RVC 2
CC&SP CTC 37 400
CC/(RVC&SP) CTC/RVC 200
CC/RVC CTC/RVC 606 8 340 122 524
CC/RVC/SP CTC/RVC 35 171
CC/SP CTC 13
CH CTC 117 152 11
CH&RVC CTC&RVC 5
CH&SP CTC 264
CH/(CS&RVC)/RVC CTC/RVC 197
CH/(RVC&SP) CTC/RVC 6
CH/RVC CTC/RVC 2,151 113 4,232 2,921 3,880
CH/RVC/SP CTC/RVC 23 327 21
CH/SP CTC 86
CS CTC 7
CS&RVC CTC&RVC 3 5,204
CS/RVC CTC/RVC 1,037 129 34 74
RVC RVC 68 4,682 222 75
RVC/SP RVC 392 1
SP Drop 70
WO WO 300 8 4 3 607
WO/SP WO 8
Total 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204 5,204
Source: Authors' computation using the legal text of each RTA
Notes: \CC," \CH," and \CS" are change in chapter, change in heading, and change in
subheading rules, respectively. \WO" and \RVC" are, respectively, wholly obtained and
regional value content rules. \SP" is a specic process rule. \&" and \/" indicate the rules
requiring to meet both and either of rules, respectively.
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Table 3: Number and Value of Imports According to Tari Scheme in 2014
(Million THB)
Number of Number of import- Total Imports
transactions rm-product pairs
MFN 1,581,713 73,162 464,431
AANZ 70,029 23 2,880
AC 604 139 724
ATIGA 494,005 10,621 210,984
AI 6 5 7
AJ 285 9 80
AK 28 10 33
Source: Authors' computation using transaction-level import data from Customs
tries according to tari schemes in 2014. Both the numbers of transactions and
import-product pairs are largest in the scheme of MFN, followed by ATIGA.
The frequency of the use of these two schemes is outstanding. Accordingly, the
large imports can be found in the cases of these two schemes.19 AANZFTA has
the third largest imports. These ndings are consistent with our observations
in Table 1, which shows high liberalization levels in AANZFTA and ATIGA.
Alternatively, AIFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA are utilized less frequently. In
particular, there are only six transactions under AIFTA when importing from
eight ASEAN countries in 2014. In addition, compared with the number of
transactions, the number of import rm-product pairs is obviously small, im-
plying that some import rm-product pairs have multiple transactions. In
other words, rms import one product from many countries and/or many
times from one country.
4. Empirical Results
This section reports our estimation results. After presenting our baseline
results, we introduce the results of some additional estimations. Basic statistics
are provided in Table 4.
19Based on this outstanding use of ATIGA, one may consider ATIGA as an exceptional
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Table 4: Basic Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Choice 14,906,435 0.1429 0.3500 0 1
ln (1+Tari) 14,906,435 0.0365 0.0937 0 0.5878
1 for CTC 14,906,435 0.0184 0.1344 0 1
1 for CTC&RVC 14,906,435 0.1451 0.3522 0 1
1 for CTC/RVC 14,906,435 0.5211 0.4996 0 1
1 for RVC 14,906,435 0.1699 0.3755 0 1
1 for WO 14,906,435 0.0027 0.0518 0 1
ln Transaction Value 14,906,435 9.4886 2.6045 0 21.7082
ln Export Price 14,906,435 4.1586 1.5828 -4.3395 16.7842
Land Transport Dummy 14,906,435 0.1972 0.3979 0 1
ln Total Imports 14,906,435 17.6826 3.0787 0 26.4457
Source: Authors' computation using transaction-level import data from Customs
Our estimation results of the nested logit model are shown in Table 5.20
Column (I) contains only the inclusive value in the upper-stage estimation. We
report standard errors clustered by import rm-product pair because rms
may import a given product many times or from multiple countries; thus,
standard errors might be correlated within an import rm-product pair. As
is consistent with our expectation, the coecients for tari rates and RoOs
dummy variables are signicantly negative. This indicates that tari schemes
with higher tari rates or those required to comply with RoOs are less likely
to be chosen. The estimated IV parameter lies between 0 and 1. This implies
that our model meets a sucient condition for global consistency with the
random utility model in discrete choice analysis.
The order of absolute magnitude of coecients for RoOs dummy variables
is worth discussing. The results indicate that the negative eects become
more serious in the order of CTC&RVC, WO, CTC, RVC, and CTC/RVC.
This result is consistent with a natural rule that meeting all multiple types
of RoOs (i.e., RoOs with \&") is more restrictive than meeting one of those
preferential scheme. This point is discussed in Section 4.
20In Table C.1 of Appendix C, we report the results of conditional logit model. As is well
known, when the IV parameter value is 1, our model can be reduced to the conditional logit
model.
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Table 5: Estimation Results: Nested Logit Model
(I) (II) (III)
Dependent variable: Scheme chosen
ln (1+Tari) -8.087*** -9.346*** -7.826***
[0.969] [0.894] [0.989]
1 for CTC -2.484*** -6.695*** -5.874***
[0.231] [0.605] [0.803]
1 for CTC&RVC -3.065*** -7.376*** -6.480***
[0.299] [0.673] [0.872]
1 for CTC/RVC -1.988*** -6.114*** -5.356***
[0.146] [0.534] [0.745]
1 for RVC -2.089*** -6.232*** -5.461***
[0.118] [0.515] [0.707]
1 for WO -2.867*** -7.149*** -6.277***
[0.277] [0.654] [0.846]
Dependent variable: Chosen nest (MFN as a base scheme)
Inclusive value 0.112*** 0.131*** 0.117***
[0.019] [0.022] [0.021]
ln Transaction Value 0.397*** 0.293***
[0.040] [0.041]
ln Export Price -0.548***
[0.059]
Land Transport Dummy -0.095
[0.257]
ln Total Imports 0.143***
[0.036]
Number of observations 14,906,435 14,906,435 14,906,435
Log likelihood -1743477.8 -1598485.1 -1475626.2
Notes: , , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels,
respectively. Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs.
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types of RoOs. It is also consistent with the rule that meeting either one
among multiple types of RoOs (i.e., RoOs with \/") is as restrictive as or
less restrictive than meeting a particular one among multiple types of RoOs.
The choice probability is lower for CTC&RVC than for WO. However, WO is
known as the most restrictive type of RoOs because an exported product must
be entirely produced or cultivated in RTA member countries. One reason for
this result is that in our sample of RTAs, almost all cases with WO are found
in agricultural goods; that is, it is not technically dicult to meet the WO
criteria for the production of agricultural goods.
The result that the choice probability is lower for CTC than for RVC is an-
other important nding. For example, Carrere and de Melo (2006) found the
opposite order between CTC and RVC in the analysis of NAFTA utilization
rates.21 As mentioned in the introductory section, our results are based on a
cross-RoOs analysis within a product, whereas those in the study by Carrere
and de Melo (2006) are based on a cross-product analysis. That is, we are
directly comparing RoOs in each product, and our results in RoOs are not
driven by dierences in product characteristics at all. Therefore, we believe
that our results indicate a more precise order of eects of alternative types of
RoOs on the choice probability. Nevertheless, we should be careful of gener-
alizing this result because the share of labor costs, local material costs, and
miscellaneous expenses, all of which are costs for \originating inputs," out of
the total production costs are high in Asia.22 Therefore, at least in Asia, it
might be easy to meet a conventional cuto in RVC (e.g., 40%).
The results in the other two columns are as follows. In Column (II), we add
a log of transaction value. As is consistent with our expectation, its coecient
is estimated to be signicantly positive, implying that RTA schemes are likely
21Carrere and de Melo (2006) found that the negative eect of RVC on NAFTA utilization
rates is larger than the negative eect of CC.
22For example, according to the \Survey of Japanese-Aliated Firms in Asia and Oceania
(FY2014) conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization, labor costs, local material
costs, and miscellaneous expenses occupy approximately 20%, 30%, and 20% in the total
production cost, respectively, on average, among 2,194 Japanese manufacturing aliates
operating in Asia and Oceania. Namely, 70% out of the total production cost is a local cost.
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to be chosen in case of larger transactions. The results with regard to tari
rates and RoOs dummy variables are qualitatively unchanged in terms of signs
and signicance. Column (III) includes all variables explained in the previous
section. The estimation results with regard to taris and RoOs are slightly
changed. The coecient for total imports is signicantly positive, indicating
that RTA schemes are likely to be chosen by the larger-sized importers in
terms of total import values. While the coecient for land transportation
dummy is insignicant, that for the average export price is estimated to be
signicantly negative. The latter result implies that lower production costs
lead to a higher probability of choosing RTA schemes. Even after controlling
for these elements, we still see a signicantly positive coecient for transaction
values. Thus, the remaining elements, such as exporter's production capability,
signicantly positively impact the probability of choosing RTA schemes.
We also report some other estimation results in Appendix C. First, we
introduce one more explanatory variable to capture the role of cumulation
rules in the second stage. Second, we focus on trade in which rms cannot
enjoy cumulation rules by restricting sample products only to nished products
since cumulation rules are utilized when imported intermediate inputs are
cumulated. Third, we exclude trade in products with zero MFN rates because
the choice set for rms might be dierent between the cases of products with
zero and positive MFN rates. Fourth, we add observations of exports from
Indonesia to our estimation sample. Fifth, we aggregate our transaction-level
data up to rm-level annual data because rms may make their decisions based
on annual benets rather than per-transaction benets.23 All these estimation
results show that as in the previous results, the coecients for tari rates
and RoOs dummy variables are estimated to be negatively signicant. RTA
schemes are also more likely to be chosen in case of larger transactions.
23We also estimate the three-stage nested logit model, which has a middle stage in the
RTA nest (i.e., ATIGA or any other RTA scheme). In this three-stage nested logit model,
IV parameters are estimated to be greater than the value 1 or be negative; and thus, they
do not meet a sucient condition for global consistency with the random utility model in
discrete choice analysis. This inconsistency may indicate that ATIGA should be placed on
the same decision stage as other RTAs.
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5. Quantitative Interpretation
This section provides some quantitative interpretation of our estimation
results. We estimate a mixed logit model, which is more exible than a nested
logit model in terms of substitution among alternatives. Finally, we conduct
some simulation analyses.
5.1. Elasticities: Nested Logit Model
Following Greene (2012), we compute the elasticities of probability of
choosing each tari scheme based on the estimation results of Column (III)
of Table 5. First, we examine the extent to which the probabilities change
when tari rates in each scheme change by 1%. The elasticity of probabil-
ity that rm k chooses alternative Alt with respect to ~nth alternative-specic
determinant of alternative fAlt, which is represented by q~n;fAlt(k), is given by
@ lnPAlt(k)
@q~n;fAlt(k) =
n
d1
h
d2   PfAltjNest(k)
i
+ Nest [d1   PNest(k)]PfAltjNest(k)
o
~n; ~n = 1;    ; n: (4)
d1 is a binary variable taking the value 1 when a nest of fAlt is the same as
that of Alt and 0 otherwise. Similarly, d2 is a binary variable taking the value
1 when alternative fAlt is same as alternative Alt and 0 otherwise. Specically,
we examine the elasticity with respect to tari rates.
The results are shown in Table 6. There are two noteworthy ndings.
First, the eect of tari rates in a scheme on the probability of choosing that
scheme is negative. We call this eect \own eect." The absolute magnitude
of this eect is much larger in RTAs than in the MFN scheme. In particular,
the magnitude is largest in AIFTA. In terms of elasticity, a 1% reduction in
AIFTA tari rates greatly increases the probability of choosing AIFTA by 70%.
These results are partly because the probability of choosing any RTA scheme
(PNest(k)) and its conditional probability given that RTA nest (PfAltjNest(k)) is
selected is small compared with the probability of choosing the MFN scheme,
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Table 6: Elasticities with Respect to Tari Rates (Mean)
Probability change
Tari change MFN AANZ AC ATIGA AI AJ AK
MFN -2.070 5.756 5.756 5.756 5.756 5.756 5.756
AANZ 0.489 -52.642 14.266 14.266 14.266 14.266 14.266
AC 0.187 5.765 -61.143 5.765 5.765 5.765 5.765
ATIGA 0.795 19.135 19.135 -47.772 19.135 19.135 19.135
AI 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -66.907 0.001 0.001
AJ 0.242 9.827 9.827 9.827 9.827 -57.080 9.827
AK 0.358 12.190 12.190 12.190 12.190 12.190 -54.718
Note: The elasticities reported in this table are based on the estimation result in Column
(III) of Table 5.
as implied from Table 3.24 As indicated in Eq. (4), these probabilities are
negatively related to the own eect.
Second, the eect of tari rates in a scheme on the probability of choosing
other schemes is positive. We call this eect \cross eect." Importantly, the
cross eects of tari rates in an RTA scheme are common across the other
RTA schemes but dierent between RTA schemes and an MFN scheme. This
consequence stems from the nature of nested logit models and is one advantage
over conditional logit models. The table indicates that the reduction in tari
rates in an RTA scheme more greatly decreases the probability of choosing
other RTA schemes than that of choosing the MFN scheme. This result is
partly based on the fact that an IV parameter is estimated to be less than the
value 1 and near 0, which implies more similarity among RTA schemes than
between RTA and MFN schemes.
Next, we compute the elasticity of probability that rm k chooses alterna-
tive Alt with respect to ~mth nest-specic determinant of nest ]Nest, which is
represented by x
~m;]Nest(k). The elasticity is given by
@ lnPAlt(k)
@x
~m;]Nest(k)
=  ~m
 
d3   P]Nest(k)

; ~m = 1;    ;m:
24These probabilities are reported in Appendix F.
23
d3 is a binary variable taking the value 1 when Alt belongs to the nest]Nest and
0 otherwise. We examine the elasticity with respect to the transaction value.
This elasticity indicates the extent to which the probability of choosing any
RTA scheme increases with a 1% increase in the transaction value. Because
exporters with larger transaction are more likely to cover additional xed costs
for RTA utilization, this elasticity is related at least partly to those xed costs.
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Table 7 indicates the mean of elasticities according to export country. We
nd that the mean of the elasticities is relatively high for relatively devel-
oped countries in our sample export countries, including Singapore (0:24), the
Philippines (0:24), and Malaysia (0:22). This result is consistent with the fact
that developed countries are supposed to have better knowledge and experi-
ence in dealing with documentation works for RTA utilization and thus have
lower xed costs for RTA utilization. Alternatively, the three least developed
countries, i.e., Cambodia (0:15), Laos (0:16), and Myanmar (0:14), have lower
elasticities.
5.2. Elasticities: Mixed Logit Model
Next, we again compute the elasticity with respect to tari rates using the
estimation results of a mixed logit model. The nested logit model produces
common cross eects of tari rates in an RTA scheme across the other RTA
schemes, as shown in Table 6. However, cross eects may dier across the
other RTA schemes. To examine this possibility, we estimate mixed logit
models, which are more exible in terms of substitution among alternatives
than the nested logit model. The specication takes a random coecients
form. We assume that all variables have normally distributed coecients.
This exibility in coecients enables us to examine the possibility that cross
eects dier across RTA schemes.
25Chen and Moore (2010) examined how multinational rms with heterogeneous total
factor productivity (TFP) self-select into dierent host countries. Specically, they esti-
mated a probit model on rms' investment abroad and decomposed the coecient for TFP
by introducing the interaction terms of TFP with various elements (e.g., market potential,
xed costs of investment, or import taris).
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Table 7: Elasticities with Respect to Transaction Values According to Export
Country
Mean S.D.
Brunei 0.1889 0.0815
Cambodia 0.1513 0.0571
Laos 0.1601 0.0885
Myanmar 0.1425 0.0623
Malaysia 0.2198 0.0735
Philippines 0.2359 0.0604
Singapore 0.2448 0.0568
Vietnam 0.1748 0.0885
Note: The elasticities reported in this table are based on the estimation result in Column
(III) of Table 5.
Table 8 shows the mean elasticities of probability of choosing each tari
scheme with respect to tari rates.26 It is found that unlike the case of nested
logit models, the cross eects of tari rates in an RTA scheme dier not only
between RTA schemes and an MFN scheme but also across RTA schemes.
There are some more interesting results. For example, a 1% reduction in MFN
rates more greatly decreases the probabilities of choosing ACFTA (by 13%)
and AIFTA (by 14%) than those of choosing the other RTAs. In addition, a 1%
reduction in ATIGA tari rates lowers the probabilities of choosing AANZFTA
(by 0:38%), AJCEP (by 0:31%), and AKFTA (by 0:49%) more greatly than
those of choosing the other RTAs (i.e., ACFTA and AIFTA) and the MFN
scheme. These results indicate that ACFTA and AIFTA belong to a group
dierent from the other RTAs. One source of such grouping might be that
26The estimation results of the mixed logit models are available in Table C.5. For es-
timation, we use the MIXLOGIT command in STATA (Hole, 2007). All variables have
signicant coecients with expected signs. The order of coecients for RoOs dummy vari-
ables is unchanged with that in the previous results. Our procedures for the computation
of elasticities are as follows. After the estimation of the mixed logit model with all indepen-
dent variables, we rst calculate the predicted probabilities in the base scenario. Second,
we increase logged tari variable in a tari scheme by one unit and calculate the predicted
probabilities in the alternative scenario. Third, we calculate the log dierence between the
two probabilities, which is taken as elasticity.
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Table 8: Elasticities with Respect to Tari Rates (Mean): Mixed Logit Model
Probability change
Tari change MFN AANZ AC ATIGA AI AJ AK
MFN -26.380 2.138 13.455 1.618 13.961 2.947 1.809
AANZ 0.154 -42.388 0.264 0.248 0.253 0.454 0.468
AC 0.037 0.020 -42.761 0.010 0.103 0.060 0.035
ATIGA 0.073 0.382 0.088 -41.104 0.080 0.307 0.493
AI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -42.871 0.000 0.000
AJ 0.007 0.170 0.014 0.172 0.013 -42.695 0.169
AK 0.010 0.206 0.022 0.223 0.015 0.174 -42.645
Note: The elasticities reported in this table are based on the estimation result in Column
(III) of Table 8.
RoOs in ACFTA and AIFTA are relatively restrictive compared with those
in the other RTAs. Thus, for example, the reduction in MFN rates induces
ACFTA/AIFTA users to switch to the MFN scheme due to the high costs of
RoOs compliance.27
5.3. Simulation
Finally, we conduct two types of simulation analyses using the estimation
result of Column (III) of Table 5.28 First, we demonstrate how the probability
changes when scheduled tari reduction is completed in all RTAs. In other
words, we calculate the expected changes in the choice probability of each RTA
scheme from 2014 to the nal year of tari reduction. In some products, tari
reduction further continues after 2014 because tari rates in some products are
scheduled to be reduced gradually or to begin several years after the enactment
of RTAs (see Table B.1 of Appendix B). The ocial nal implementation
27Indeed, we also estimate the three-stage nested logit model, which has a middle stage
in the RTA nest. Specically, given the choice of RTA schemes, rms choose either a group
of ATIGA, AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA or a group of ACFTA and AIFTA before
choosing a specic RTA scheme. The results are reported in Table C.4 of Appendix C.
Estimated IV parameters lie in the unit interval. Log likelihoods are also higher than those
in Table 5.
28The simulation analyses based on the results in the mixed logit model are presented in
Table C.6 and show similar results as in Table 10.
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Table 9: Remaining Tari Reduction in Each RTA
G = 0 0 < G < 5 5  G < 10 10  G
AANZ 8,270 267 317 703
AC 9,069 10 258 220
ATIGA 9,557 0 0 0
AI 7,859 704 227 767
AJ 7,941 323 904 389
AK 8,662 88 529 278
Note: \G" indicates the dierence between nal preferential rates and preferential rates in
2014.
years of ATIGA, AKFTA, ACFTA, AJCEP, AIFTA, and AANZFTA are 2015,
2017, 2018, 2018, 2020, and 2020, respectively. The magnitude and number of
remaining tari reduction in each RTA are shown in Table 9. \G" indicates the
dierence between nal preferential rates and the preferential rates in 2014.
The largest number of products with further tari reduction can be found in
AIFTA, whereas no further reduction occurs in ATIGA.
We indicate the percentage points by which the probability changes be-
tween 2014 and the nal year. To do that, we rst calculate the predicted
probabilities in the base scenario. Second, we replace the level of a tari vari-
able in 2014 with tari rates scheduled in the nal year of each RTA and calcu-
late the predicted probabilities in the alternative scenario. Third, we calculate
the mean dierence between the two probabilities according to tari schemes.
The results are shown in the \Taris" column of Table 10. AANZFTA (0:38
percentage points) and AJCEP (0:80 percentage points) are RTAs that are ex-
pected to experience a rise of probability from 2014 to the nal year. Such rise
is due to the fact that further reduction remains in a relatively large number
of products in those RTAs as shown in Table 9. Although AIFTA also has a
large number of products with further tari reduction, the restrictive RoOs in
AIFTA hamper the rise of probability. The largest decline is found in ATIGA
( 0:80 percentage points) because tari reduction is already completed in 2014
as shown in Table 9.
Second, we indicate the percentage points by which the probability changes
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Table 10: Probability Change: Tari Reduction in Final Year and Least Re-
strictive RoOs (Percentage Points)
Taris RoOs
AANZ 0.38 -0.02
AC -0.18 1.35
ATIGA -0.80 -2.67
AI 0.00001 2.69
AJ 0.80 0.08
AK -0.08 -0.97
MFN -0.12 -0.46
Note: The probability changes are based on the estimation result in Column (III) of Table
5.
if RoOs in all RTAs are set to the least restrictive type. As found in the
previous estimation results, RoOs are found to be restrictive in the order of
CTC&RVC, WO, CTC, RVC, and CTC/RVC. Therefore, we set RoOs in all
RTAs to CTC/RVC, calculate predicted probabilities in the alternative sce-
nario, and compute the mean dierence according to tari schemes. The re-
sults are shown in the \RoOs" column of Table 10. In most cases, the absolute
magnitude in this simulation is larger than that in the previous simulation,
i.e., \Taris." ACFTA (1:35 percentage points) and AIFTA (2:69 percentage
points) are RTAs that experience a great rise of probability. This result is
reasonable because these two RTAs have relatively restrictive RoOs, as shown
in Table 2. The most restrictive RoOs, i.e., CTC&RVC, are originally set in
all products in AIFTA, whereas the least restrictive RoOs, i.e., CTC/RVC,
are set in few products in ACFTA. The probability of choosing the other
RTAs (except for AJCEP) is expected to decline. The largest decline is found
in ATIGA (2:67 percentage points) due to the fact that the least restrictive
RoOs are already set in almost all products in ATIGA, as shown in Table 2.
6. Concluding Remarks
This study examined the determinants of choice probability of tari schemes
when an MFN scheme and multiple RTA schemes are present. Specically,
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we used transaction-level data of Thai imports from other ASEAN countries
in 2014. In this ow, seven tari schemes, including six RTA schemes and an
MFN scheme, are available. By estimating theoretically consistent nested logit
models with this data, we found that tari schemes with lower tari rates are
more likely to be chosen. Further, we revealed that RTA schemes with more
restrictive RoOs are less likely to be chosen. In particular, tari schemes with
\WO rule" or \CTC and RVC rule" are less likely to be chosen, while rms
are more likely to choose tari schemes with \CTC or RVC rule." In addition,
any RTA scheme is likely to be chosen in the case of large transactions.
Using the estimates, we further conducted some quantitative analyses. For
example, we examined the extent to which the probability of choosing each
scheme changes when tari rates decline by 1% and the extent to which the
probability of choosing any RTA scheme changes when transaction values in-
crease by 1%. In the latter analysis, we found a relatively large eect when
exporting from Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia, which are relatively
developed in our sample of export countries. We also examined how the prob-
ability changes when scheduled tari reduction is completed in all RTAs or if
RoOs in all RTAs are set to the least restrictive type, i.e., CTC/RVC. The
largest rise of choice probability from 2014 to the nal year is found in AJCEP
due to the fact that further reduction remains in a relatively large number of
products. The change in RoOs to the least restrictive RoOs raises probabili-
ties of choosing ACFTA and AIFTA because these two RTAs originally have
relatively restrictive RoOs.
These results imply that rms choose the best tari scheme according to
tari rates and RoOs. Therefore, rms face a choice problem when the number
of available RTAs increases. This issue might be one form of the spaghetti
bowl phenomenon (Bhagwati et al., 1998). If one RTA scheme has the lowest
preferential tari rates and most business-friendly RoOs (e.g., CTC or RVC)
in all tari lines, then rms do not need to make a choice regarding tari
schemes. In the context of Asia in particular, RCEP just covers all of our
sample RTAs (i.e., ATIGA and the ve ASEAN+1 RTAs) in terms of member
countries. Therefore, RTA utilization costs will be lowered and spaghetti bowl
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phenomena may disappear if RCEP is designed to provide lowest preferential
tari rates and most business-friendly RoOs in each tari line among the
existing six RTAs.
Appendix A. Theoretical Framework
In this Appendix, we provide the theoretical framework concerning our
nested logit model. Specically, it extends the model of tari scheme choice
developed by Demidova and Krishna (2008) and Cherkashin et al. (2015) by
introducing multiple RTA schemes into the choice set of tari schemes. We
also introduce an unobservable component in marginal cost to derive a theo-
retically consistent nested logit model. Intermediate goods are assumed to be
tradable, and producers of these goods make decisions regarding exports and
tari schemes.
Appendix A.1. Final- and Intermediate-Good Producers
There are J countries, including the home country, in the economy. The
representative nal-good producer combines L types of intermediate inputs
without paying any additional costs and produces its output in the competitive
market. The production function of the representative nal-good producer in
a country is given by a Cobb-Douglas function
y =
LY
l=1
[y(l)](l) ;
LX
l=1
(l) = 1:
y denotes the output, and y(l) denotes the amount of the intermediate input
l. Let k represent each of intermediate inputs. y(l) is dened as
y(l) =
 
JX
i=1
Z
k2
i(l)
[yi(l; k)]
 1
 dk
! 
 1
; 1 <  <1:
 denotes the demand elasticity of intermediate inputs. Each variety is pro-
duced by one intermediate-good producer. 
i(l) is a set of varieties of product
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l purchased from country i by the representative nal-good producer. Final-
good producers use both domestic and foreign inputs.
Cost minimization leads to demand schedules
yi(l; k) =

pi(l; k)
p(l)
 
y(l); y(l) = (l)

p(l)
P
 1
y:
Thus, a higher relative price leads to lower demand. pi(l; k) denotes the import
price of each variety, and price indices are dened as follows:
p(l) =
 
JX
i=1
Z
k2
i(l)
[pi(l; k)]
1  dk
! 1
1 
; P =
LX
l=1

p(l)
(l)
l
:
Each intermediate-good producer k is assumed to be so small that we can
ignore the eect of each intermediate-good producer's (exporter's) behavior
on macroeconomic variables in the importing country such as price index.
Combining the above equations, the demand function is explicitly derived as
yi(l; k) = [pi(l; k)]
  [p(l)] 1 Y (l);
where Y (l) captures the input value of intermediate input l and is dened by
Y (l)  (l)Py:
Intermediate-good producers sell the outputs to domestic and foreign nal-
good producers. Following Mayer et al. (2010), we assume that the marginal
cost of each intermediate-good producer k, which produces product l in country
i, is given by
mci(l; k) =
!i(l)i(l; k)
'(k)
;
where '(k) represents the rm-specic production capability. !i(l) is the ex-
port county-product specic component of marginal cost such as the wage level
and various transaction costs. These two terms are assumed to be observable.
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i(l; k) is an unobservable component of marginal cost and will become the
residual term in our empirical equation. Prot-maximizing price is derived as
~pi(l; k) =

   1
!i(l)i(l; k)
'(k)
:
Thus, the prot-maximizing price is obtained as the product of markup and
marginal cost. ~pi(l; k) represents the so-called \free on board" price when we
consider exports.
Appendix A.2. Export Prots
For simplicity, we do not assume any xed costs of domestic supply. Sup-
pose that rms in a country i can choose a tari scheme from among MFN and
multiple RTA schemes when exporting to a concerned country. The decision is
decomposed into two steps: a rm decides whether to use MFN (M) or RTA
schemes (R(r); r = 1;    ; NR) and selects the most protable RTA scheme
if a rm decides to use RTA schemes. NR is the number of RTA schemes
available for rms. In any case, they need to pay xed costs for exports, de-
noted by fi.
29 Furthermore, when exporting under RTA schemes, they need
to incur additional xed costs for RTA utilization denoted by fRi . These two
types of xed costs are assumed to be specic to each export country and same
across products without loss of generality. We assume that xed costs for RTA
utilization are the same across RTA schemes. This assumption is useful to de-
rive a nested logit equation to estimate the conditional RTA scheme choice.30
Similar assumptions are employed in studies on FDI location choice such as
29We assume that exporters pay xed costs for exports to each destination following Help-
man et al. (2004) and Helpman et al. (2008). In other words, exporters do not save on the
total xed cost of dealing with export processes for multiple destinations at the same time.
We also assume a similar situation for the xed cost for RTA utilization, i.e., exporters pay
the xed cost for RTA utilization for each transaction. Furthermore, given that the model is
static, mitigation of these xed costs through the exporters' experiences is not considered.
Consideration of these possibilities would provide richer theoretical consequences; however,
we do not examine such cases to keep the model tractable and focus on deriving the nested
logit model.
30The empirical validity on this assumption is discussed in Section 3.2.
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those by Head and Mayer (2004), Amiti and Javorcik (2008), and Mayer et al.
(2010).
We assume the presence of three types of variable costs to export. First,
we let TM and TR(r);i represent one plus per-unit MFN and RTA tari rates,
respectively (TM ; TR(r);i > 1). We assume that MFN rates do not depend on
export countries following the practical application of MFN taris.31 Second,
the iceberg physical transport costs (i > 1) are introduced. Finally, we assume
the costs for procurement adjustment to comply with RoOs (R(r);i > 1). When
utilizing RTA schemes, exported products must meet RoOs. To comply with
these RoOs, exporters may need to change their procurement sources, resulting
in a rise of procurement costs. Such additional procurement costs for RoOs
compliance are captured by R(r);i. Thus, R(r);i is higher for RTA schemes
with more restrictive, or more costly, RoOs. Because these rules are set at an
RTA-product level, R(r);i is also dierent across RTAs. Letting R represent
the RTA scheme with the highest variable cost among available RTA schemes,
we assume that R;iTR;i < TM so that both MFN users and RTA users exist in
imports of a product from a country.
The respective export prices under MFN and RTA schemes are given by
pM;i(l; k) = TMi~pi(l; k);
pR(r);i(l; k) = R(r);iTR(r);ii~pi(l; k):
Further, export prots under respective regimes can be derived as follows:
M;i(l; k) = (k)Y (l)(l)
[!i(l)M;i(l; k)]
1 
[TMi]
   fi;
R(r);i(l; k) = (k)Y (l)(l)

!i(l)R(r);i(l; k)
1 
R(r);iTR(r);ii
   fi   fRi ;
31Our sample countries in the empirical work do not include non-WTO member countries.
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where
(k)  ['(k)] 1 ; (l)  (   1) 1   [p(l)] 1 :
Thus, export prots are found to be increasing in productivity '. It is also
straightforwardly indicated that tari rates in respective schemes (T ), im-
porter's demand (Y ), observable and unobservable marginal costs (! and ),
and transportation cost () aect export prots. For RTA schemes, the vari-
able costs for RoO compliance () also aect export prots.
Appendix A.3. Choice of Tari Schemes
To simplify the description, we drop index l hereafter. We also drop i
because we focus on trade in particular country pairs in our empirical sections.
In addition, we assume that destination markets are segmented and that each
exporter makes decision regarding tari scheme choice for each destination
market. Consequently, we can analyze the behavior of an exporter in the
exporting country to an importing country independently. The probability
that an exporter chooses the RTA scheme r0 given that the exporter chooses
RTA schemes rather than an MFN scheme is given by
PR(r0)jRTA(k) = P

R(r0)(k) > R(r)(k)
	
= P
n
R(r)T

R(r)

R(r)(k)
 1
> R(r0)T

R(r0)

R(r0)(k)
 1o
= P

(   1) ln R(r)(k)  ln R(r0)(k)
   ln R(r0)   ln R(r)   lnTR(r0)   lnTR(r) > 0	: (A.1)
for all r0 6= r 2 RTA. The right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) presents the determi-
nants of the choice probability of R(r0) among alternative RTA schemes. The
probability rises when variable costs of RoOs compliance (R(r0)) or preferen-
tial tari rates (TR(r0)) fall relative to other RTA schemes. Firms' production
capability does not aect the choice among RTA schemes as xed costs for
RTA utilization are assumed to be the same for all the available RTA schemes.
Letting R represent the RTA scheme with the highest export prot among
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the available RTA schemes, the probability that an exporter chooses RTA
schemes rather than an MFN scheme is obtained in the following manner:
PRTA(k) = P fR(k) > M(k)g = P
(
'(k) >

! 1fR 
Y op(k)
 1
 1
)
= P

(   1) ln'(k)  ln fR   (   1) ln!    ln 
+ lnY + ln  + lnop(k) > 0
	
; (A.2)
where
op(k)  [RTR ]  [R(k)]1    T M [M(k)]1  :
The elements that aect the choice between RTA and MFN schemes are
shown on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.2). Firms with higher capability
are more likely to use RTA schemes rather than an MFN scheme. The prob-
ability falls with costs for production and transportation (! and ). Further-
more, the probability is positively associated with MFN tari rates (TM). All
these results are consistent with those by Demidova and Krishna (2008) and
Cherkashin et al. (2015) although they do not examine the choice probability
explicitly. Further, the probability rises with the demand value of each im-
port rm, which is represented by Y in our theoretical framework, as larger
customers (importers) would benet exporters more as a result of larger sales
and larger export prots.
Appendix B. Dierences in Tari Rates and RoOs
Table B.11 shows the distribution of AJCEP preferential products in Thai-
land. Table B.12 presents the dierences in tari rates and RoOs in Thailand
for household or laundry-type washing machines.
Appendix C. Other Estimation Results
In this Appendix, we report some other estimation results. First, we start
from the estimation of conditional logit model rather than nested logit model
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Table B.11: Distribution of AJCEP Preferential Products in Thailand
Number Share (%)
Zero-MFN 1,619 19.5
Immediate Elimination 2,184 26.3
Late Start 384 4.6
5 Years 3 0.0
6 Years 16 0.2
9 Years 320 3.9
10 Years 45 0.5
Gradual Elimination 3,590 43.26
1 Year 189 2.3
2 Years 873 10.5
3 Years 27 0.3
4 Years 1,611 19.4
5 Years 20 0.2
6 Years 116 1.4
7 Years 415 5.0
9 Years 339 4.1
Partial Reduction 84 1.0
Exclusion 439 5.3
Source: Authors' calculation using the legal text of AJCEP
Table B.12: Dierences in Tari Rates and RoOs in Thailand for Household
or Laundry-Type Washing Machines (Each of a Dry Linen Capacity Not Ex-
ceeding 6 kg: HS84501110)
Tari (%) RoOs
MFN 30
AANZ 0 CH / (CS&RVC35) / RVC40
AC 20 RVC40
ATIGA 0 CH / RVC40
AI 11 CS & RVC35
AJ 0 CH / RVC40
AK 20 CH / RVC40
Source: Authors' computation using the legal text of each RTA
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for comparisons. The results are shown in Table C.1 and are qualitatively
unchanged with those in Table 5. The tari schemes with lower tari rates
are more likely to be chosen. All coecients for RoOs dummy variables are
signicantly estimated. The order of their absolute magnitude is not changed.
RTA schemes are also more likely to be chosen in larger transactions or by
larger-sized importers.
Second, we focus on imports of nished products. Namely, to exclude the
eects of cumulation rules, we focus on trade in which rms cannot enjoy such
rules, that is, on imports of nished products, because cumulation rules are
utilized when imported intermediate inputs are cumulated. Specically, we
restrict sample products categorized into 112, 122, 51, 61, 62, or 63 in the
Broad Economic Categories. In this restricted sample, there are few import
transactions under AI or AK. Therefore, we drop import observations under AI
and AK and their choices. Due to the same reason, we drop \CTC&RVC" and
\WO" from the category of our RoOs dummy variables. The results are shown
in Column (I) of Table C.1. As in the previous results, the coecients for tari
rates and RoOs dummy variables are estimated to be negatively signicant.
RTA schemes are also more likely to be chosen in larger transactions.
Third, we estimate our model only for trade in products with positive MFN
rates. Firms have an incentive to utilize RTA schemes even when importing
products with zero MFN rates (i.e., to enjoy cumulation rule). Indeed, in prod-
ucts with zero MFN rates, there are 41,720 transactions under RTA schemes,
which constitute 7% of all transactions under RTA schemes.32 Nevertheless,
the motivation to utilize RTA schemes will dier between the cases of products
with zero and positive MFN rates. At least in the case of products with zero
MFN rates, rms do not have an incentive to lower duty payment on those
products by utilizing RTA schemes; therefore, we restrict sample products only
to those with positive MFN rates and show the estimation results in Column
(II) of Table C.2, which are qualitatively unchanged from the previous results.
Fourth, we add observations of exports from Indonesia to our estimation
32The more detailed gures are shown in Appendix D.
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sample. So far, we did not include those observations since the number of
available tari schemes is dierent between Indonesia and the other ASEAN
countries (i.e., Indonesia is not a member of AJCEP). However, it is possible
to include those observations because the nested logit model requires only
dening a universal choice set (Greene, 2002). This is another advantage of the
use of nested logit models in the analysis of tari scheme choice when multiple
tari schemes are available. The results are shown in Column (III) of Table
C.1. The number of observations greatly rises. The results are qualitatively
unchanged in terms of signs and the order of coecients for RoOs dummy
variables.
Fifth, rms may make their decisions based on annual benets rather than
per-transaction benets. An ideal way to examine this case is to estimate our
nested logit model for the data aggregated according to export rms (and prod-
ucts). However, we cannot take this strategy because our dataset is import
data and cannot identify export rms. Instead, we use the data aggregated
according to import rms (and products and export countries). The gap be-
tween the data aggregated according to export and import rms depends on
whether each import rm trades a product with a single rm in an export
country. Transaction values used as an independent variable are also aggre-
gated as above. We drop import rm-product-export country observations in
which multiple tari schemes are chosen. For example, one rm imports a
product from Singapore under four schemes: ACFTA, ATIGA, AJCEP, and
MFN. Approximately 10% of observations are dropped by this treatment.33
The estimation results are shown in Column (IV) of Table C.1. Overall, the
results are qualitatively unchanged through these treatments in terms of signs
and signicance. One notable dierence is that the coecient for land trans-
port dummy turns out to be signicantly negative, indicating higher costs in
transportation by truck or railway.
Sixth, we introduce one more explanatory variable in the second stage. So
33The patterns of tari scheme choice for dropped observations is introduced in Appendix
E.
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far, we have dierentiated across RTA schemes only in terms of tari rates
and RoOs. However, member countries dier across RTA schemes. Each
ASEAN+1 RTA includes at least one non-ASEAN country (e.g., Japan in the
case of AJCEP, and AANZFTA includes two non-ASEAN countries, Australia,
and New Zealand). Suppose that a rm in Thailand produces a product using
inputs imported from ASEAN countries and exports that product to a plus-
one country under the corresponding ASEAN+1 RTA scheme. If the rm
\cumulates" those inputs when certifying the origin of the exported product
(i.e., the rm enjoys cumulation rules), then those inputs need to be imported
under the same ASEAN+1 RTA.34 As a result, import rms that export to a
plus-one country may be more likely to choose the corresponding ASEAN+1
RTA.35
To examine this additional element, we introduce a variable of export
dummy that takes the value 1 if a rm has a record of exports to a plus-
one country in case of the choice of the corresponding ASEAN+1 RTA and 0
otherwise. For example, this variable takes the value 1 in case of the choice of
AJCEP if a rm exports any products to Japan and the value 0 in case of the
choice of the other schemes. Naturally, this variable always takes the value 0
in the case of the choices of MFN and ATIGA because ATIGA does not have
any non-ASEAN plus-one countries.36 The estimation results are shown in
34This is an important requirement to cumulate imported inputs in ASEAN's RTAs. For
example, when a rm in Thailand imports intermediate products (including those with zero
MFN rates) under the MFN scheme from Malaysia, which is another member of AJCEP,
those intermediate products are not taken as originating inputs in AJCEP when exporting to
Japan. Only the intermediate products imported under AJCEP can be taken as originating
inputs in AJCEP.
35Although Bombarda and Gamberoni (2013) theoretically examined the role of diagonal
cumulation, their model does not incorporate this mechanism. For more details of cumula-
tion rules or empirical analysis of the trade creation eect of cumulation rules, see Augier
et al. (2005), Estevadeordal et al. (2008), and Hayakawa (2014b) in addition to Bombarda
and Gamberoni (2013).
36Another possible pattern of production is that exporters to Thailand use inputs from
a plus-one country (e.g., Malaysian rms import key parts from Japan under AJCEP and
export their products to Thailand under AJCEP). Obviously, it is impossible to statisti-
cally examine this case because we need the import data of exporters in the other ASEAN
countries.
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Column (V) of Table C.1. The coecient for export dummy is insignicantly
estimated. This result may indicate that rms in Thailand do not enjoy cu-
mulation rules much in exports to plus-one countries of nal goods produced
using intermediate inputs imported from other RTA members.37 The results
in the other variables are qualitatively unchanged.
Seventh, based on the outstanding use of ATIGA schemes as found in
Table 3, one may consider ATIGA as an exceptional preferential scheme. To
examine this possibility, we estimate the three-stage nested logit model, which
has a middle stage in the RTA nest. Specically, given the choice of RTA
schemes, rms choose either ATIGA or any other RTA scheme before choosing
a specic RTA scheme. The results are shown in Table C.3. IV parameters are
estimated to be greater than the value 1 or be negative; thus, they do not meet
a sucient condition for global consistency with the random utility model in
discrete choice analysis. This inconsistency may indicate that ATIGA should
be placed on the same decision stage as other RTAs. In addition, we estimate
another three-stage nested logit model in which rms choose either a group of
ATIGA, AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA or a group of ACFTA and AIFTA
at a middle stage. The results are reported in Table C.4. IV parameters are
estimated to lie in the unit interval. Log likelihoods are also higher than those
in Table 5.
Finally, the results of the mixed logit model are available in Table C.5.
Our simulation results using those results are shown in Table C.6.
Appendix D. Zero MFN Rates
Table D.1 shows the number of transactions in products with zero MFN
Rates.
37Indeed, the number of users of cumulation rules is small in ASEAN. According to
the \Survey of Japanese-Aliated Firms in Asia and Oceania (FY2014)" conducted by the
Japan External Trade Organization, only 26 Japanese aliates in ASEAN enjoy cumulation
rules, constituting 2% of all surveyed aliates in ASEAN, 3% of the exporters, and 7% of the
RTA users. It is also worth noting the possibility that rms may meet RoOs even without
cumulating imported inputs if domestic content (e.g., labor inputs or local intermediate
inputs) is suciently high.
40
Table C.1: Estimation Results: Transaction-level Conditional logit
(I) (II) (III)
ln (1+Tari) -10.856*** -12.185*** -10.933***
[0.792] [0.716] [0.841]
1 for CTC -8.195*** -12.474*** -11.958***
[0.981] [1.091] [1.206]
1 for CTC&RVC -13.171*** -17.471*** -16.919***
[0.478] [0.673] [0.865]
1 for CTC/RVC -3.421*** -7.718*** -7.119***
[0.172] [0.550] [0.774]
1 for RVC -4.353*** -8.654*** -8.079***
[0.725] [0.810] [0.815]
1 for WO -10.913*** -15.601*** -15.101***
[1.007] [1.124] [1.214]
RTA * ln Transaction Value 0.417*** 0.308***
[0.042] [0.044]
RTA * ln Export Price -0.556***
[0.062]
RTA * Land Transport Dummy -0.06
[0.264]
RTA * ln Total Imports 0.153***
[0.037]
Number of observations 14,906,435 14,906,435 14,906,435
Log likelihood -178861 -1635408 -1547997
Notes: , , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels,
respectively. Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs.
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Table C.2: Robustness Check: Nested Logit Model
Finished Zero MFN Indonesia Annual Export
Dependent variable: Scheme chosen
ln (1+Tari) -4.973*** -6.082*** -5.319*** -7.711*** -7.927***
[1.189] [1.284] [1.207] [0.192] [0.902]
1 for CTC -6.537*** -6.426*** -5.236*** -7.698*** -6.116***
[0.838] [0.999] [0.738] [0.148] [0.761]
1 for CTC&RVC -6.885*** -5.593*** -7.920*** -6.859***
[1.075] [0.805] [0.180] [0.805]
1 for CTC/RVC -6.259*** -6.028*** -4.892*** -7.179*** -5.492***
[0.864] [0.941] [0.679] [0.125] [0.725]
1 for RVC -6.671*** -6.104*** -4.994*** -7.601*** -5.552***
[0.822] [0.910] [0.651] [0.138] [0.687]
1 for WO -6.736*** -5.505*** -7.957*** -6.612***
[1.046] [0.784] [0.186] [0.789]
Export Dummy -0.176
[0.142]
Dependent variable: Chosen nest (MFN as a base scheme)
Inclusive value 0.061 0.09 0.076 0.095 0.145
[0.015] [0.023] [0.021] [0.008] [0.024]
ln Transaction Value 0.503*** 0.318*** 0.365*** 0.718*** 0.293***
[0.073] [0.046] [0.038] [0.016] [0.041]
ln Export Price -0.690*** -0.440*** -0.497*** -0.485*** -0.541***
[0.138] [0.078] [0.049] [0.010] [0.060]
Land Transport Dummy -0.296 -0.056 -0.299 -0.185*** -0.086
[0.341] [0.280] [0.243] [0.040] [0.259]
ln Total Imports 0.121* 0.168*** 0.090** -0.238*** 0.149***
[0.068] [0.041] [0.035] [0.015] [0.035]
Number of observations 1,681,639 10,345,210 19,059,255 584,970 14,906,435
Log likelihood -222003.59 -1313377.2 -2120269.4 -25228.745 -1475626.2
Notes: , , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, re-
spectively. Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs. In the
\Finished Products" column, we restrict sample products only to nished products, which
are categorized into 112, 122, 51, 61, 62, or 63 in the BEC. In column \Zero MFN," we
exclude trade in products with zero MFN rates. Column \Indonesia" adds observations of
exports from Indonesia to our estimation sample. In column \Annual," we aggregate our
transaction-level data up to rm-level annual data and drop import rm-product-export
country observations in which multiple tari schemes are chosen. The export dummy vari-
able takes the value 1 if a rm has a record of exports to a plus-one country in case of the
choice of the corresponding ASEAN+1 RTA and 0 otherwise.
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Table C.3: Robustness Check: Nested Logit Model
Dependent variable: Scheme chosen
ln (1+Tari) -5.696***
[0.018]
1 for CTC 59.232***
[1.662]
1 for CTC&RVC 34.180***
[0.272]
1 for CTC/RVC -1.666***
[0.002]
1 for RVC 47.100***
[0.375]
1 for WO -5.744***
[0.198]
Middle: ATIGA or Other RTAs
Inclusive value -25.823***
[0.211]
Top: MFN or RTA (RTA as a base scheme)
Inclusive value 1.718*
[0.011]
Number of observations 14,906,435
Log likelihood -1262013.9
Notes: This table reports the estimation result of the three-stage nested logit model, which
has a middle stage in the RTA nest. Specically, given the choice of RTA schemes, rms
choose either ATIGA or any other RTA scheme before choosing a specic RTA scheme.
, , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels, respectively.
Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs. The specication
with other explanatory variables did not reach the convergence of log pseudo likelihood.
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Table C.4: Results of Three-Stage Nested Logit Model: ACFTA/AIFTA
(I) (II) (III)
Dependent variable: Scheme chosen
ln (1+Tari) -8.270*** -9.541*** -8.016***
[0.017] [0.020] [0.021]
1 for CTC -3.098*** -7.374*** -6.451***
[0.016] [0.021] [0.023]
1 for CTC&RVC -3.802*** -8.189*** -7.187***
[0.084] [0.097] [0.090]
1 for CTC/RVC -2.126*** -6.263*** -5.465***
[0.003] [0.010] [0.015]
1 for RVC -2.154*** -6.297*** -5.496***
[0.004] [0.010] [0.015]
1 for WO -2.703*** -6.977*** -6.115***
[0.013] [0.020] [0.022]
Middle: (ACFTA/AIFTA) or Other RTAs
Inclusive value 0.223*** 0.256*** 0.226***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Top: MFN or RTA (RTA as a base scheme)
Inclusive value 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.049***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ln Transaction Value -0.397*** -0.293***
[0.001] [0.001]
ln Export Price 0.550***
[0.001]
Land Transport Dummy 0.098***
[0.005]
ln Total Imports -0.142***
[0.001]
Number of observations 14,906,435 14,906,435 14,906,435
Log likelihood -1685560.2 -1540836 -1453929
Notes: This table reports the estimation result of the three-stage nested logit model, which
has a middle stage in the RTA nest. Specically, given the choice of RTA schemes, rms
choose either ACFTA/AIFTA or any other RTA scheme before choosing a specic RTA
scheme. , , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels,
respectively. Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs.
44
Table C.5: Estimation Results: Mixed Logit Model
(I) (II) (III)
ln (1+Tari) -62.560*** -45.636*** -42.872***
[5.103] [6.518] [5.932]
1 for CTC -22.691*** -38.628*** -35.133***
[1.677] [4.851] [5.775]
1 for CTC&RVC -41.859*** -46.889*** -44.372***
[4.318] [5.982] [6.832]
1 for CTC/RVC -23.610*** -33.385*** -28.874***
[8.016] [3.814] [4.035]
1 for RVC -21.169*** -36.156*** -33.177***
[1.707] [5.293] [6.302]
1 for WO -27.025*** -43.844*** -40.769***
[2.060] [5.539] [6.159]
RTA * ln Transaction Value 1.979*** 1.391***
[0.253] [0.217]
RTA * ln Export Price -2.570***
[0.620]
RTA * Land Transport Dummy -0.212
[1.179]
RTA * ln Total Imports 0.665***
[0.227]
Number of observations 14,906,435 14,906,435 14,906,435
Log likelihood -1547355.8 -1652942.1 -1476333.1
Notes: , , and  represent signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical levels,
respectively. Parentheses are standard errors clustered by import rm-product pairs. The
specication takes a random coecients form. All variables are assumed to have normally
distributed coecients. The results in standard deviations are omitted.
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Table C.6: Probability Change: Tari Reduction in Final Year and Least
Restrictive RoOs (Percentage Points)
Taris RoOs
AANZ 0.35 -0.59
AC -0.002 2.53
ATIGA -0.74 -3.30
AI -0.0001 2.56
AJ 0.66 -0.14
AK -0.05 -1.24
MFN -0.22 0.18
Notes: The probability changes are based on the estimation result in Column (III) of Table
C5.
Table D.1: Number of Transactions in Products with Zero MFN Rates
All MFN = 0 Share
AANZ 70,029 19 0.00
AC 604 31 0.05
ATIGA 494,005 41,667 0.08
AI 6 0 0.00
AJ 285 1 0.00
AK 28 2 0.07
Total 564,957 41,720 0.07
Source: Authors' computation
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Table E.1: Combination of Two RTA Schemes in Three-Scheme Users
AANZ AC ATIGA
ATIGA 1 26
AI 1
AJ 2
AK 2
Source: Authors' computation
Table E.2: Combination of Two Schemes in Two-Scheme Users
AANZ AC ATIGA AJ AK
ATIGA 1 46
AI 3
AK 3
MFN 4 25 3,209 2 2
Source: Authors' computation
Appendix E. Utilization of Multiple Tari Schemes
In this Appendix, we introduce the patterns of tari scheme choice by rms
who import a given product from a given country under multiple tari schemes
in 2014. First, one rm imports a product from Singapore under four schemes,
including ACFTA, ATIGA, AJCEP, and MFN schemes. Second, there are 32
rm-product pairs that import from a given country under an MFN scheme
and two RTA schemes. The combination of the latter two schemes is reported
in Table E.1. Most of the three-scheme users utilize AANZFTA, ACFTA, and
MFN schemes. Furthermore, more than 3,000 rm-product pairs import from
a given country under two schemes, of which the combination is shown in
Table E.2. MFN and ATIGA schemes are utilized by most of the two-scheme
users.
Appendix F. Choice Probabilities
Table F.1 shows choice probabilities of respective nests and alternatives.
47
Table F.1: Choice Probabilities of Respective Nests and Alternatives
PAltjNest(k) PAlt(k)
AANZ 0.23318 0.06246
AC 0.09441 0.02388
ATIGA 0.31042 0.10162
AI 0.00001 0.00000
AJ 0.16224 0.03089
AK 0.20025 0.04580
MFN 1 0.73549
Source: Authors' computation
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